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Abstract
In this article two colleagues are in conversation regarding doctoral supervision: The 
first author acted as a doctoral supervisor, while the collaborative author was a doctoral 
candidate during three years of study. The first author offers a narrative account of his 
sceptical encounter with the candidate while the candidate offers an account of her 
experiences during her doctoral studies. Drawing on the seminal thoughts of Harvard 
philosopher Stanley Cavell (1997), particularly on his ideas on ‘living with scepticism’, 
the first author argues that postgraduate student supervision ought to be an encounter 
framed by scepticism. He points out that supervising students sceptically might engender 
moments of acknowledging humanity within the Other (autonomous action); attachment 
to the Other’s points of view with a readiness for departure (deliberative engagement); 
and showing responsibility to the Other (recognition of the other). Not necessarily in 
response, but certainly in conversation, the candidate presents her own experiences 
of encountering two unknowns, namely, the writing process demanded by a doctoral 
dissertation, and the unknown Other of a doctoral supervisor. She journeys her shift from 
naïve attachment to a writing that she thought she owned to one of mature detachment, 
strong enough to stand on its own. In exploring the necessary sense of completion and 
arrival that ought to accompany the doctoral process, the candidate singles out elements 
of trust, belief and the knowledge that the doctoral supervisor ought to attach the same 
value to a student’s work as he/she does. Finally, in recognition of the unexpected of 
the doctoral journey, the candidate reflects on the flourishing of a friendship, which 
emerged from an encounter of scepticism.
Keywords: doctoral supervision; scepticism; autonomous action; deliberative 
engagement; friendship
THE FIRST AUTHOR’S VIEW
Acknowledging humanity within the Other
It seems quite apposite to use Cavell’s (1979) depiction of one’s relationship with 
the Other to attend to postgraduate student supervision; in this instance, some of the 
experiences of and my pedagogical encounters with Nuraan Davids over the past 
three years. Central to one’s connection with the Other is the view that one has to 
acknowledge humanity in the Other of which the basis for such action lies in oneself: 
‘I have to acknowledge humanity in the other, and the basis of it seems to lie in me’ 
(Cavell 1979, 433). Davids became a doctoral student on the basis of having been 
introduced to me by a colleague. Her eagerness to pursue doctoral studies, coupled 
with her critical acumen, astuteness and independence of mind, made an indelible 
impact on me, to the extent that I was persuaded to begin a doctoral journey with her. 
Hailing from Cape Town, she had completed her Master’s degree at another South 
African university and subsequently applied to Stellenbosch University to pursue 
doctoral studies under my supervision, on the grounds that my area of educational 
research connected with her own interests in democracy and citizenship education. 
Since she is an intelligent, proud and hard-working person, we soon connected and 
developed a mutually respectful, trustworthy and professional relationship. The fact 
that our friendship developed so remarkably over the past three years is a profound 
testimony to how both of us recognised our humanity within ourselves and in 
association with one another. As further recognition of Davids’ commitment and 
humanity, the University of Stellenbosch supported her attendance of the Annual 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain Conference in Oxford – a visit 
that exposed her to other Philosophy of Education students and academics abroad. 
The conversations at Oxford further and significantly influenced her understanding 
of and writing on democratic citizenship and cosmopolitan education in relation to 
Islamic education. Thus, our friendship was consolidated further, primarily because 
she felt that I had acknowledged her as a fellow human being. In acknowledging 
others as human beings worthy of respect, one should simultaneously acknowledge 
oneself as a person who should exercise respect. This is what I think Cavell (ibid., 
435) has in mind when he claims:
Another may be owed acknowledgement simply on the ground of his humanity, 
acknowledgement as a human being, for which nothing will do but my revealing 
myself to him [her] as a human being, unrestrictedly, as his or her sheer other, his or 
her fellow, his or her semblable. – Surely this is, if anything, nothing more than half 
the moralists whoever wrote have said, that others count, in our moral calculations, 
simply as persons; or that we have duties to others of a universal kind, duties to them 
apart from any particular stations we occupy.
I considered myself to be Davids’ ‘semblable’ who would later invite her to review 
articles for a journal of which I am the editor. For me, she possesses the analytical 
and evaluative competence and skills to write excellent reviews, and I always enjoy 
her caring and often uncompromising judgements of others’ work. I have found her 
autonomous action in commenting on other people’s academic work very similar to 
her authoring of her own doctoral text.
Attachment with a readiness for departure
Of course, as supervisors we are responsible for effecting changes in the lives of 
our students, so we teach them to be civil. And this I have done through exposing 
Davids to academic writings that aim to cultivate democratic iterations (learning to 
talk back), citizenship rights and cosmopolitan justice, particularly in relation to the 
production of theses that aim to contribute towards justice in and about (Islamic) 
education. But this does not mean that we ought to censure students’ actions so 
that we determine in advance what they ought to research in order to connect their 
work with achieving civility, or what consequences they may face if they do not 
write theses that connect with issues of civility (e.g. having their work rejected by 
me). Teaching our students to connect with issues of civility, following Cavell (ibid., 
325), makes us ‘open to complete surprise at what we have done’. In other words, 
supervisors and students can be initiated into practices concerning what is morally 
good for society, but with the possibility that what is perceived as good for society 
is always in the making, continuously subjected to modifications and adaptations. 
For instance, it may be morally good for society to produce work (theses) about 
advancing a common understanding of Islamic education – and we may decide this 
in advance; but when a common understanding of Islamic education is not shared 
by some Muslim homosexuals (some of the candidate’s interviewees), interactions 
with them may result in moments of excluding the Other and otherness. Davids’ 
thesis departs from making arguments for excluding otherness, and hence seems 
to come into conflict with a common understanding of Islamic education, that is, 
what seems to be desirable for the broader public good. The point I am making 
is that my thoughts alone did not influence her thesis; rather, her independence of 
mind and critical insights determined the thoughts that went into the formulation of 
her arguments. Thus, when I supervise students I initiate them into relevant forms 
of life, that is, by showing them what I say and do, and accepting what they say 
and do as what we say and do. To put it differently: supervisors tell themselves 
and others (students) how they must go about things without predicting this or 
that performance. Cavell (ibid., 179) makes the point that ‘the authority one has, 
or assumes, in expressing statements of initiation ... is related to the authority one 
has in expressing or declaring one’s promises or intentions’. So, when students are 
supervised they are initiated into a form of life intended by the supervisor. This 
also implies that students can subvert these forms of life as they wish. They may be 
transformed by the practice of supervision, and also subvert this practice in order 
to give themselves other opportunities – such as those unintended actions of the 
practice. I often found that Davids produced revised chapters in which the intended, 
agreed upon outcomes had not been attained at all.
Responsibility to the Other
Cavell’s remark, (ibid., 384) ‘we are alone, and we are never alone’, is a clear 
indication that one does belong to a particular group (being alone with others, that is, 
‘we’) and that, by virtue of being human, one bears an internal relation to all other 
human beings – especially those who might not belong to the same group as one. This 
internal relation with my fellow human beings does not ignore my answerability to/
responsibility for what happens to them, although I do not belong to the same group 
as they do. As a member of a particular cultural group in society I cannot just impose 
my views (albeit religious or political) on others, for that in itself would deny that 
there are others in different positions (with different cultural orientations) to mine. 
Doing so would be doing an injustice to others. But being answerable to/responsible 
for what happens to them means that their views are acknowledged, although I 
might not be in agreement with them. Rather, one conceives the Other from the 
Other’s point of view, with which one has to engage afresh (ibid., 441). Initially, 
I challenged Davids’ singular understanding of normative Islamic education. Yet I 
acknowledged her views, although I might have been in stark disagreement with 
them. In so doing, I did not compromise my relations with her, for that would 
have meant a complete breakdown of our professional friendship. From my own 
vantage point I might find another person’s views repugnant (what Cavell would 
refer to as living my scepticism), but this does not mean that I view this person as 
being unworthy of any form of engagement. That would be an abdication of my 
responsibility. The point I am making is that, as a human being, I can distinguish 
firmly between my understandings of a practice and the understandings others have 
of the same practice. But this does not mean that I compromise my humanitarianism 
to others – a matter of exercising my responsibility to them. For instance, Davids 
queried my understanding of a normative conception of Islamic education. I was 
obliged to find ways to engage with her with the intention of making her understand 
what I consider to be a justifiable conception of the practice; or, if I found her lack of 
seeing my viewpoint to be untenable, I should have responsibly made known to her 
what was seemingly unknown.
In demonstrating one’s responsibility towards others, one immediately 
acknowledges one’s capacity for intimacy with others – thus limiting one’s 
idiosyncratic privacy. It is for this reason that Cavell (ibid., 463) claims that ‘human 
beings do not necessarily desire isolation and incomprehension, but union or reunion, 
call it community’. If my privacy remains restricted to me with the intention not 
to exercise my responsibility to others, my practices would remain unshared and 
separated from the people with whom I happen to engage. So, my privacy opens 
a door through which someone else can tap into my thoughts – which might be of 
benefit either to the person concerned or to society at large. But if my privacy is 
prompted by narcissism, the possibility that others might gain something valuable 
for the good of society might be stunted. If I were to reflect more on my academic 
encounters with Davids, then I would be able to refer to two articles I co-authored 
with her. These works grew out of our doctoral engagement and she is recognised 
as the first (primary) author. My responsibility towards her as a supervisor was also 
to contribute towards creating conditions for her self-empowerment – and, when 
she saw her name linked to mine as the primary author of peer-reviewed journal 
articles, she smiled. I knew then that my responsibility towards her had taken on a 
new dimension. Subsequently, I asked her to co-author two more articles and two 
book chapters. Again, my responsibility towards her took another turn. 
In a Cavellian fashion I have learnt that supervisors ought to be responsible 
human beings with regard to their students. Responsibility towards our students 
implies that they have to create opportunities for them to think, argue and write 
their texts at a doctoral level. Writing is a truly laborious, yet imaginative, exercise. 
I have taught students to continue writing even though the comments they receive 
would at times not be as encouraging as they might have expected. Finally, I have 
realised that student supervision is about building a friendly relationship between 
the supervisor and the student – one that can bring forth the articulations of both in 
an atmosphere of mutual trust, respect and responsibility. My three years of working 
with Davids can be considered as a sceptical encounter with the Other. This implies 
that one needs to experience the Other as a culturally situated being; one needs 
to engage deliberatively – and at times belligerently so – with the Other through 
reading, authoring and presenting; and one needs to establish opportunities for the 
Other to be present in his or her becoming. Of course, my pedagogical encounters 
with Davids have not been without complexities and contradictions, that is, without 
scepticism. She usually became annoyed with me for sometimes commenting on her 
work over-zealously. Yet, my at times rigorous feedback did not discourage her (I 
think) from completing her work. In a way, her doctoral work has taken seriously 
the work of argumentation – what a thesis should actually be doing. Many South 
African doctoral studies (and I have examined a few) focus too much on techniques 
of educational research instead of applying the techniques while doing research. 
That is to say, generally too many studies are concerned with letting the reader know 
what procedures of research have been applied in education, yet these studies do not 
always develop consistent argumentation. My connection with Davids has always 
privileged the argumentative route, with the result that her study has been often 
lauded as theoretically rigorous. However, her study did not and should not ignore 
the technical and professional use of procedures of educational research, but I would 
advocate that less emphasis should be placed on these techniques and more on the 
arguments that should emanate as a result of using the techniques. Often, too many 
students write a chapter on techniques that seem to be unrelated to the arguments 
that ensue in their theses. In a way, students should work (like Davids has done) on 
the techniques with a readiness to depart from their often pedantic use – a matter of 
becoming sceptical. 
THE SECOND AUTHOR’S PERSPECTIVE
The decision to pursue my doctoral studies was not an easy one. I knew that it would 
require much of my time and energy – two assets that were already over-extended 
by three children and full-time employment. But I knew that I was beginning to lose 
my passion for the project and developmental work I was doing in schools, and was 
looking for something to fill the void. It was the persistent encouragement from a 
mutual colleague that finally led to my first meeting with my doctoral supervisor, 
Prof. Yusef Waghid. I had entered that meeting with a vague, but uncompromising 
idea of what I wanted to do, namely, to write about something that would change 
me. It needed to be something that I could pour myself into, and that would push 
me in another direction in my life – which meant that it had to be something close 
to my heart. The decision to focus my research on whether commensurability exists 
between the lived experiences of Muslim women and cosmopolitanism was to a large 
extent about making sense of my own space and place in a pluralist society. In many 
respects my research topic was a peculiar one. I had never consciously explored 
any aspects of my identity as a Muslim woman – pretty much embodying Wadud’s 
(2006, 19) description: ‘Since they are Muslim, they do Islam’. Secondly, other than 
attending madrassah (Muslim school), and sporadic classes as they aroused my 
interest, I had never seriously studied Islamic education, which, I would later begin 
to understand as education in Islam. It is within this context that I need to explain 
my initial feelings of intimidation and ineptness on meeting a supervisor, who was 
known to be a renowned scholar in, among other areas, philosophy, Islamic education 
and democratic citizenship education. Our initial discussions were dominated by my 
supervisor’s voice, giving direction in terms of who and what I needed to read and 
read and read, what my proposal needed to look like, and then a flurry of due dates 
to chapters, which were beyond my wildest comprehension. These discussions came 
at such a speed – not in terms of rate, but in terms of expectation – that I consciously 
refused to take any notes, lest I forgot to actually listen and absorb all that was said. It 
was at once overwhelming and deeply challenging – my biggest fear and realisation 
centring on the fact that if I were to write this dissertation it would mean making 
myself known to my supervisor, to those who read it, and to myself. By our second 
meeting, it was a sense of great dis-ease and alarm that I realised that if I were going 
to spend the next few years writing what I hoped to write about, I needed to learn and 
believe two things, respectively: learn to trust Waghid, and believe that he cared as 
much about my dissertation as I did.
Detachment with a readiness for arrival
The decision to include my own story as one of the case study stories was never part 
of my initial plan, and when Waghid first suggested it, I met the idea with both scorn 
and trepidation. I felt that I was being pushed into revealing a part of myself that I 
did not wish to reveal, but I also knew that beneath the protests lurked an insecurity 
to write about myself. By not including myself, I was safe from being seen, from 
being heard. Strangely, I thought nothing of writing about the lives of other Muslim 
women – of laying bare their thoughts, their joys, their angst – in fact, I struggled to 
understand why Muslim women were reluctant to participate in my research. And 
yet, I had the audacity to balk at my supervisor’s suggestion to include my own voice 
– not as the narrator, but as an actor and participant. Later, I would learn through 
reading the work of Charles Taylor (1994, 25), that growing up and living under the 
conditions of an apartheid-established society had left me with a distorted or reduced 
mode of being. Taylor (1989, 49) maintains that in order to have a sense of who we 
are, there have to be notions of how we have become, and of where we are going. 
Our sense or way of being, therefore, cannot develop in isolation from either the 
spaces we inhabited or from those who participated in our lives. Our identity, says 
Taylor (1994, 25), is partly shaped by how we have been seen and recognised by 
others in our lives, but by equal measure it is partly shaped by how we are not seen 
and recognised by others:
Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition 
of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, 
if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves.
It was wonderfully liberating to encounter the works of Taylor – in attaching meaning 
to my identity, to how it had been shaped, recognised and misrecognised, I could 
detach myself from the fear of making myself known. Making myself known meant 
that I could finally release myself from a distorted way of being; it allowed me to 
become who I needed to be in order to be free from the myths and perceptions which 
had previously been mediated onto my identity. But this realisation came later – after 
a particular encounter with my supervisor. 
Knowing my unwillingness, and sensing my fear, Waghid shared his own story 
with me – a story of democratic citizenship education vis-à-vis his upbringing. I 
distinctly remember the afternoon when it happened. I had arrived with a list of 
questions to his latest comments – determined to re-assert what I felt was my loss 
of control over of my research. I felt that he had been pushing me too hard, and 
wary of other students’ complaints that promoters often imposed their own ideas or 
ways of doing things onto their students, I was determined to re-articulate that the 
ownership of this dissertation was mine, and not his – a position I would later learn, 
was not only ridiculously selfish, but in direct contradiction to my expectation that 
my supervisor ought to attach as much value to my dissertation as I did. Sensing 
my combative mood, he ignored my questions (and my tone), and started telling his 
story. I was baffled. Up to this point I had only encountered Waghid, the Professor. 
Now I was encountering the Other. I must have sat in numbed silence for an hour 
– taken aback by his willingness to share – then got up and left. His willingness to 
share with me probably had a greater impact on me than he could have imagined. I 
think in that moment two things had happened – in one sense I no longer saw myself 
as just his student. Somehow, by revealing his story, he had conceptually levelled 
the playing fields, and had erased what I perceived to be the power structure of 
supervisor-student relationship – the one constructed on the basis of one knowing 
much, and the other not knowing enough. I do not think Waghid simply chose to 
share his story in order to convince me to write about mine. I think he really wanted 
me to see and recognise him, so that I could see and recognise myself. 
Later, after I had finally discarded my masks of play and pretence, I would begin 
to ask who I was afraid of being seen by, and what I was afraid of – what others 
might see, or what they might not see, or perhaps, that I would finally see myself. 
Cavell (1979, 382) asks:
How can I fail to believe in my expression of myself, my capacity to be able to present 
myself for acknowledgement? I have this pain, I am proud or ashamed of this deed, 
humiliated by this thought. But if I fail to believe in the other’s acknowledgement of 
me, must I be failing to believe in the other’s capacity to accept these facts, to measure 
their reality for me, perhaps to share them?
My initial unwillingness to insert my own life into the story I was narrating was 
my unwillingness to confront who I was and who I was about to become. While I 
absolutely needed affirmation and acknowledgement that what I was presenting was 
in fact that which was being read and experienced, I was deeply suspicious of my 
supervisor’s responses – any criticism of my writing (of which there were many) 
would now become a criticism of me, but, upon reflection now, I was also deeply 
sceptical of myself. To Cavell (ibid., 388), these scepticisms are borne out of an ill-
fated need to silence the self and to live in ignorance:
So saying that I cannot just not know myself amounts to saying that I am the one who 
is fated to have, or to begin with, an average knowledge of myself. And doesn’t this 
amount to saying that I am the one who is fated to keep myself in a certain (average) 
ignorance of myself? What is the form of this ignorance, an ignorance of something I 
cannot just not know? Is it to be thought of as keeping a secret? But in what form can 
I keep a secret from myself, keep silent?
And so, my dissertation was no longer a research study of six diverse Muslim 
women in a diverse society; my research no longer existed outside of my life, my 
knowledge and my secrets – I had become the main protagonist in my own research. 
And the deep irony was that while I had bewailed to Waghid that my insertion and 
inclusion would attach and reveal me too much in my research, what evolved was a 
detachment from my writing (to which I had held so tightly, and so fiercely), which 
allowed me to take Cavell’s (ibid., 383) advice:
To let yourself matter is to acknowledge that you want the other to care, at least to care 
to know. It is equally to acknowledge that your expressions in fact express you, that 
they are yours, that you are in them.
And yet, because we cannot, in the Cavellian sense, ‘produce in others the responses 
you imagine would satisfy you’ – my supervisor, after reading the first draft of my 
story, did not acknowledge me or what I had written, instead, he asked why my story 
was so clean and neat. This was typical of the way Waghid supervised my work and 
engaged with me: he was never satisfied; he always felt that there was more to say, 
and that I was holding back. But that simple question to what I had thought had been 
the most intimate part of my writing, was the key to my detachment from whom I 
thought I ought to be. And, perhaps, more profoundly, I would learn that in writing 
there was always more to say, more to reveal, more to expect, and to be ever watchful 
for the unexpected.
The Other’s responsibility to the Other
If our discussions up to this point had been defined by intense debates, disagreements 
– me refusing to relent on what I thought I needed to say, and him continuously 
questioning if not what I was saying, then how I was saying it – then the weeks that 
followed the afore-mentioned development were ones of amity and calm. It was 
as if a storm had passed, and the muddy waters needed to clear. The turmoil I had 
experienced in my writing – often instigated by my supervisor’s persistent (almost 
relentless) questioning of my work – had certainly become a part of the way we 
interacted with each other. Waghid seldom accepted any of my first drafts – even 
when I felt convinced that it was the best that I could do. When his critical feedback 
came barely an hour after I had sent my work to him, I would read his comments 
with resentment and irritation – irritated, because his immediate responses invariably 
meant that he was waiting for an amended version, which meant more work and 
more writing. I was writing at every opportunity – and was writing a new chapter 
while revising earlier ones – often bemused by what I had written before. It seems 
that the more I wrote, the more I needed to re-write – everything was changing 
– I was being exposed to a myriad different texts, ideas, theories, and arguments 
that needed to be re-filtered through my own context and writing. While there were 
nights when I could not stop writing, there were nights when I simply could not 
think of one more word. It was wonderfully exhausting, and while I had retreated 
from most of my social interactions, and pretty much parented in distraction, life had 
not retreated from me. In the midst of working and writing a doctoral dissertation, 
my mother suffered a stroke and my father-in-law passed away. On both occasions, 
while Waghid acknowledged my concern, my despair and my grief, he ended each 
conversation with a reminder of due dates, of agreed upon time-lines. I considered 
his behaviour bizarre. What I expected was to be told to take some time off, and 
to spend some time with my family, but that was not forthcoming. And yet, even 
under circumstances of what can only be described as his lacking a certain level of 
empathy, he was in fact extending compassion – not to the woman in his presence, 
but to the student in his care. And so while Cavell (ibid., 384) contends that ‘we are 
alone, and we are never alone’, there are indeed times, even in our internal relations 
with all other human beings, even those whom we think we know well, when we are 
indeed alone. The acknowledgement that I received from my supervisor was neither 
what I expected nor what I would necessarily agree upon, but ultimately his justice 
towards me was enacted through being answerable to me as a student and what I 
needed to do. 
In many respects I had embarked on a road not only less travelled (as Robert Frost 
would encourage us to do), but often wondered whether indeed I had the right to be 
on the road I had chosen. I had deliberately chosen as case studies Muslim women 
who came from diverse backgrounds, whose understanding of, and relationship with, 
Islam might not sit too comfortably in a conception of normative Islam, and indeed, 
might cause, as it did, offence to certain readers. I expected some criticism, a few 
raised eyebrows – which is not to say that I wrote the dissertation with the intention 
to disturb and disrupt. Whatever disruption there proved to be, would be only as a 
jarring that conceptions of homogeneity and uniformity are as fluid and mercurial 
as trying to explain to a non-believer what it means to believe in the grace of God. 
My contribution would be to acknowledge the humanity of not only Muslim women, 
but others of all faiths and even of no faith at all, of those who were steadfast and of 
those who lived in doubt – that ultimately we are all connected by the singular virtue 
of our humanity.
My decision to include the exploration of a Muslim, gay woman, for example, 
was twofold: to recognise her, and therefore take responsibility for the respect due to 
her as a human being; and to make known that as in other faith-based communities, 
women are different and assume varied roles and identities, which ought not to 
preclude them from participating in their faith. Was I prepared, then, for what, even 
now, feels like an onslaught on my character? Was I prepared for the accusations of 
the undermining of my own faith? No, and I doubt anything could have prepared 
me for it. It came as a bolt out of nowhere. I was shattered – not by the black words 
on the white paper, but for yet again being mis-recognised, for being distorted into 
someone else’s myth, and being contorted into justifying someone else’s version of 
the truth.
When the voice of comfort and reassurance came, it was from Waghid – not in 
the form of defending his student or what she had written, but in the form of whether 
I still believed in what I had written. It was a deeply emotional time for me – a 
time when I found myself temporarily stepping outside of my community. Benhabib 
(1992) asserts that the situated self cannot be de-linked from the community in which 
it has been shaped and in which it lives, and I had no desire to either de-link myself 
or to offend it. My presentation of the multiplicities of identities amongst Muslim 
women, while provocative in a community of conservative silences, was not written 
to provoke the outrage of others. But the person, who had started this dissertation, was 
not the person, who had completed it. And the supervisor whom I first encountered in 
2009 was no longer the intimidating professor. I had become known to him, and he 
had become what he describes as my fellow, or semblable. He inundated me with the 
writing of reviews, reading proposals for dissertations, authoring new articles, co-
authoring with him – pushing me from one text to another, until the one threaded into 
the other, and the writing simply could not, and has not stopped. Three years later I 
find myself absorbed and submerged in the writing and reading of texts I could never 
have imagined. My journey has been profoundly rewarding, and most of all, I have 
found a friendship in one whom I might never have encountered had I not allowed 
me to acknowledge myself. 
In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle (350 B.C./2004) discerns between three 
types of friendships, namely: (1) friendship based on utility, where affection is 
motivated by people’s own good, and pleasure is derived from how much advantage 
one can gain from it; (2) friendship based on pleasure, which is motivated by people›s 
own pleasure, which is why these friendships seldom last; and (3) friendship based 
on goodness, in which each person alike wishes good for the other, and they are 
good in themselves. To Aristotle, friendships based on goodness are perfect, because 
this type of friendship is permanent, because it possesses the attributes friends ought 
to possess. I do not know whether I am a good person, and I am equally sceptical 
that I possess all the attributes to which Aristotle alludes. But I do know that in my 
supervisor I have encountered a good person, a good friend, who has seen the good in 
me, and who has inspired me to be the best possible good that I can be in my writing. 
This friendship was neither quick to be made, nor was it, or is it, one of ongoing 
agreement and peace. It has been fraught with dissension and opposing viewpoints, 
but never short of deep respect. Through Waghid’s willingness to let himself be 
known by me, and through allowing me to articulate and express viewpoints, with 
which he often disagreed, but never dismissed, I have been privy to an incredible 
journey to getting to know myself and others. I listen to other students, when they 
bemoan the writing process – and they have full right to do that. Writing a doctoral 
dissertation can be just the writing of a very thick document, supplemented by a 
brief encounter between two people, who might never see each other again. But 
it can and does hold the potential for so much more, and so much of that depends, 
on the one hand, on how much a supervisor is prepared to invest of him- or herself 
in the student. And this has so much more to do with an investment of the self, of 
reflections, of engagement, and of moments of wrongness, than it does to do with 
having time or being right. And perhaps, as has been my experience, it is for the 
student to detach him- or herself enough from his or her own writing so that he or 
she, too, can see the supervisor as one who needs to be connected with, as one who 
ought to, and can be trusted, as an Other, who, in fact, has more to offer than he or 
she stands to gain.
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